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Few features of our criminal process have been so disfavored and
yet so durable as plea bargaining. Despite misgivings about both its
wisdom and its constitutionality, and calls for its abolition,1 the prac-
tice shows no sign of vanishing: the guilty plea still accounts for an
overwhelming majority of our criminal dispositions.
2
The continued prevalence of plea bargaining signifies that the
arguments against it have proven unequal to the administrative ration-
ale in its favor.3 So long as it remains impossible for our criminal sys-
tem to permit every defendant to claim his right to a jury trial, some
inducements for the surrender of that right will be necessary. At the
moment, plea bargaining is our only vehicle for granting such induce-
ments. Moreover, absent a dramatic increase in legal resources or the
appearance of some other strategy which compensates for our shortage
of those resources, plea bargaining is likely to endure.
Nevertheless, the present bargaining process may be neither the only
nor the most equitable way to induce a large volume of guilty pleas. 4
It may be possible to attain the administrative goals of plea bargaining
at less cost to the interests of both the defendant and the public. This
Note contends that the present bargaining process is incompatible with
enlightened and fair sentencing policy because it arbitrarily favors
some classes of defendants and fails to generate the information which
1. Many commentators have decried the inequitable aspects of plea bargaining. See
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); Rossett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS
70 (1967); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. RLV. 1387 (1970).
2. Guilty pleas comprise over ninety per cent of all dispositions in son jurisdic-
tions, particularly criminal courts in large metropolitan areas such as New York. See THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TilE ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTicr TASK
FORCE REPORT: TIlE COURTS 9 (1967). In the federal system, the volume of guilty pleas
remained constant at around seventy per cent during the period 1967.68. See Annual
Report, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in REtPORTS Ot
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE UNITED STATES 261 (1968).
3. The Supreme Court has apparently found the administrative rationale for plea
bargaining compelling. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court livid that
plea bargaining does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Recently, the Court inter alia
reaffirmed its Brady holding in Santobello v. New York, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971).
Brady and Santobello can be viewed as the culmination of a long series of lower court
rulings upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Turner,
423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967); Barber v.
Gladden, 327 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.
1964); Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958).
4. Accepting the inevitability of plea bargaining, several commentators now advocate
not its abolition but its reform. See, e.g., Tentative Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty-
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); Enker, Perspectives
on Plea Bargaining in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND "IIIE AD.
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108 (1967); White, Proposal
for the Reform of Plea-Bargaining, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1971).
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any criminal system needs to make intelligent dispositions. It is the
argument of this Note that this sentencing failure is attributable to two
factors: (1) the absence of a regularized advocacy procedure which
would impose rigor and consistency on the determination of plea-con-
cessions, and (2) the inability of the judge to oversee the formulation
of plea agreements.
This Note therefore urges the elimination of unregulated "bargain-
ing" between the defendant and the prosecutor. In its place, the Note
proposes restructuring the pre-plea stage of the criminal process to in-
clude an advocacy proceeding in which the judge exercises full respon-
sibility for the concessions the defendant receives in exchange for his
plea.
I. The Failures of the Current Bargaining Process
A. Plea Bargaining as a Sentencing Decision
Both appellate courts and scholarly commentators have tacitly con-
sidered the plea bargaining process the sole preserve of defense and
prosecution. Judicial participation in the process-at least before the
defendant tenders his plea-has been viewed with nearly universal
distaste.5
5. The scholarly literature on plea bargaining reflects an almost total hostility to
judicial participation in the bargaining process. See, e.g., ABA STANDAn s, Supra note 4.
at 3.3; White, supra note 4, at 452-53; Note, Unconstitutionality, supra note 1, at 1392;
Recent Development, 19 STAx. L. Rev. 1082, 1089 (1967). Virtually the only commentator
favoring an expanded judicial role in plea bargaining is Enker, supra note 4.
The court decisions, however, present a somewhat more complicated picture. They
have frequently distinguished between judicial threats and judicial concessions, as they
may affect pre-plea bargaining. The judge who threatens hardship to a defendant for
exercising his right to trial has been universally condemned. See Aiken v. United States,
296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957); Euziere
v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); Letters v. Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403,
193 N.E.2d 578 (1963).
Concessions offered by a judge prior to entry of the plea have been 'dewed more
favorably than judicial threats. See Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel.
McGrath v. Lavallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
Nevertheless, the clear weight of authority seems to condemn judicial concessions as
well. See Worcester v. Comm'n of Internal Revenue, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966) (dicta);
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 356 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); McClure v.
Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. IV. Va. 1964) (dicta); People v. Earegood, 12 Mich. App.
256, 162 N.V. 802 (1968); Rogers v. State, 136 So. 2d 331, 243 Miss. 219 (1962); Common-
wealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 253 A.2d 689 (1969); Commonwealth ex ret. Kreckes i.
Moroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966) (dicta).
If, however, the judge merely states his sentencing inclination and avoids any express
sentencing assurance, his conduct is felt to be less reproachable. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. McGrath v. Lavallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1963).
The judge may also consult with the prosecutor alone to explore whether his negotiating
position is satisfactory to the court. Or prior to the entry of the plea, the judge may
confer with both prosecutor and defense counsel, again to consider the suitability of
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This insistence on insulating the bargaining process from judicial
intrusion reflects a widespread misconception of plea bargaining's role
in a criminal proceeding. Plea bargaining is commonly characterized
as a strategic rather than an adjudicative or a sentencing activity.0 Its
purpose is believed to be the negotiated surrender of the defendant's
procedural rights in return for tactical concessions uniquely within the
discretion of the prosecutor to gTant.7 It is generally assumed that the
calculation of the costs and risks of litigation and the subsequent choice
of litigation strategy are tasks which the parties themselves are best
qualified to perform. If the defendant wishes to waive his procedural
rights, the courts will customarily feel bound to respect his tactical
judgment-provided, of course, that this judgment is not the product
of undue coercion or misinformation." Likewise, if the parties to a
litigation, civil or criminal, voluntarily agree to limit the issues they
will contest before the court, the judge will feel similarly bound to
defer to their tactical decision to forego adjudication.
Unlike the typical procedural waiver, however, the guilty plea con-
stitutes much more than a selection of strategy which the defendant
the plea bargain they have independently conceived. The former practice seeins fairly
widespread. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by Prosecutors to Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 906 (1964). The latter practice apparently occurred
in United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968) and was there ap-
proved. It is also the prevailing procedure in the Kings County, New York Criminal
Court, see Krantz, An Evaluation of the Kings County lea Negotiation Conference Pro.
gram, 1971 (unpublished manuscript prepared for CJCC, Boston University Law School),
and in Illinois, see Mills, The Prosecutor: Charging and Bargaining, 1966 ILL. L. Rrv.
511, 519 (1966). The ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 3.3(b), gives this form of jutdlicial
participation qualified approval, although recommending that such participation occur
only at the initiative of the defendant.
Despite the dim view that appellate judges take of virtually all forms of pre.plea
judicial intervention, there is evidence that it is a surprisingly widespread practice
among trial judges. Some 32.9 per cent of the prosecutors interviewed in thirty states
indicated that the judge was involved in some phase of the bargaining process. See Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra at 905. At the very least, this statistic suggests a disparity
in the perspectives from which trial and appellate judges regard plea bargaining.
6. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970), used language suggestive of this
approach when it justified plea bargaining by stressing its "mutuality of advantage" for
defense and prosecution.
7. In Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969), Judge Bazelon apparently
endorsed this concept of plea bargaining as a legitimate exchange of tactical concessions:
When there is substantial uncertainty concerning the likely outcome of a trial,
each side is interested in limiting those inherent litigation risks. The prosecutor
may be willing to accept a plea of guilty on a lesser charge rather than chatnce
an acquittal on the more serious. The accused may be similarly willing to acknowl.
edge his guilt of the lesser charge rather than risk conviction on the more serious
charge, or to accept the promise of a lighter sentence to escape the possibility of
conviction after trial and a heavier sentence.
Id. at 276 (footnote omitted).
8. The Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1972), although divided, was
in agreement on the proposition that courts should disturb the results of plea bargaining
only when the prosecutor "unfairly burden[s] or intrude[s] upon the defendant's decision.
making process." Id. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 69 infra.
9. See Rossett, supra note 1, at 79.
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will then employ in the formal adjudication of his guilt. Instead, it
completely ends that adjudication and makes the defendant's guilt a
settled legal fact. Moreover, as the product of a plea bargain, the de-
fendant's guilty plea also embodies an assessment of his culpability,
the moral gravity of his conduct, his danger to society and the punish-
ment which the social and individual dimensions of his case require.
The plea bargain, therefore, not only preempts the duty of tile judge
to adjudicate the defendant's guilt or innocence in concert with the
jury; it also preempts the duty of the judge to sentence the convicted
defendant.10
B. The Methodology of Effective Sentencing
Since plea bargaining performs a sentencing function, it must be
evaluated according to its ability to generate dispositions that comport
with accepted sentencing standards. To undertake that evaluation, it
is first necessary to examine the principles of effective sentencing.
For the past few decades, penologists and legal scholars have advo-
cated individualized sentencing as the most enlightened method of
disposition for convicted defendants." Individualized sentencing looks
for sentencing criteria to the totality of the defendant's circumstances-
to the detailed facts of his crime and to his criminal and personal
biography.'
2
10. Enker, supra note 4, at 109-10, is alone among the critics of plea bargaining in his
concern for its erosion of judicial sentencing authority.
11. See Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge. 40
F.R.D. 55 (1966), for an exposition of the principles and goals of individualized sentencing.
See also Bennett, Countdown for Judicial Sentencing, FED. PROBATION. Sept. 1961. at 24:
Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv. 499 (1969).
12. Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Justice, 23 L,w AND CON-
TEMP. PROB. 461, 461 (1958), outlines this approach:
[T]o "individualize" the sentence in the case of any specific offender means first, to
differentiate him from other offenders in personality, character, sociocultural back-
ground, the motivations of his crime, and his particular potentialities for reform
or recidivism; and, secondly, to determine which, among a range of punitive, cor-
rective, psychiatric and social measures, is best adapted to solve the special set of
problems presented by that offender in such a way as materially to reduce the
probability of his committing crimes in the future.
Legislatures have responded to these theories by enacting sentencing statutes which
vest broad discretion in the judge. Many jurisdictions now grant wide judicial discre-
tion in the setting of minimum and maximum sentences; others have introduced indeter-
minate sentencing. For a survey of these statutory policies, see D. GLsER, F. ConiaEN &
V. O'L.ARv, THE SENTENCING AND PAROLE PROCESs 9-15 (1966). Coupled with this increase
in judicial discretion is the effort to permit probation and parole boards as well as
prison authorities to revise judicial sentencing decisions. "Administrative sentencing"
is especially prevalent in California, Washington, Oregon, Missouri and Minnesota. In
these states, the parole board or a sentencing administration sets the minimum sentence
at the conclusion of an observational period which follows judicial commitment. See
Hayner, Sentencing by an Administrative Board, 23 L,,w AND CON'TE-. PRou. 477-9-1
(1958).
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Coupled with this commitment to individualized sentencing, there
has been an emerging concern for fair sentencing procedure. Both the
courts and penologists have stressed the orderly flow of relevant infor-
mation into the sentencing process and the procedural rights of the
defendant as that process unfolds.' 3 Not only has the penological value
of the pre-sentence report been increasingly stressed;' 4 there is also
growing agreement that its contents must be divulged to the defendant,
who can then dispute either its factual accuracy or its broader hypothe-
ses about his behavior. 15 In theory, both prosecution and defense
should use this report as authority for their sentence recommendations;
occasionally, the defense may even elaborate on its sentence recommen-
dation in the form of a detailed treatment proposal.1 0 Such "sentenc-
ing due process" is considered valuable not just because it helps achieve
responsible sentencing, but also because it demonstrates the state's con-
13. The ascendancy of the sentencing hearing has been accompanied by a growing
concern for the procedural regularity of sentencing procedures. Attention has focused
on the right to counsel at sentencing proceedings-a right apparently granted in Mempha
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), where the Court designated sentencing as a "critical stage"
of the defendant's case. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. ,18 (1962), the Court inplied that a
defendant must receive reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to
sentencing. Moreover, there is emerging case law guaranteeing the defendant the right
to speak in his own behalf and to introduce evidence at the sentencing hearing. See
Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing-From "Mapp" to "Mempha" to "McGautha,"
49 TEXAS L. REV. 25 (1970). Furthermore, many commentators urge judicial exposition
of the reasons for the sentences imposed, see Rubin, supra note 11, at 72; Frankel, The
Sentencing Morass and a Suggestion for Reform, 3 CRiM. L. BULL. 365 (1967); and ap.
pellate review of sentencing, see Rubin, supra note 11, at 74; DeCosta, Disparity and In-
equality of Criminal Sentences: Constitutional and Legislative Approaches to Appellate
Review and Reallocation of the Sentencing Function, 14 How. L.J. 29 (1968); Hruska,
Appellate Review of Sentences, 8 AM. CtmI. L.Q. 10 (1969).
On the general subject of sentencing procedure, see K. DAVIS, Disci rTiONAR" JUSICE
133-41 (1967) and Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative Ideal; The 'iew
From "Mempha v. Rhay," 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968).
14. On the pre-sentence report generally, see Note, The Presentence Report: An
Empirical Study of its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEo. L.J. 451 (1970).
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WIrtOUT TRIAL 1I
(1966) notes that some jurisdictions employ the pre-sentence report as an additional
check of the defendant's guilt and the trustworthiness of his guilty plea.
15. Despite Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1969), disclosure of the pre-sentence
report is becoming an accepted procedure. The practice was mandated for the Fifth
Circuit in Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955), and several state courts
now require it as well. For the current arguments for and against disclosure, see Bach,
The Defendant's Right of Access to Pre-sentence Reports, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 674 (1967).
16. Such a use of the pre-sentence report contemplates tranforming the sentencing
hearing into an advocacy hearing, with defense counsel offering a comprehensive anatlysis
of the defendant's character, criminality and treatment prospects. It has been observed
that it therefore envisions a radically altered concept of the defense cotinSel-one hard
to square with his traditional adversarial role. See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert
-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961). Kadish believes
that it is valuable for the defendant himself to take an active role in debating the punish.
ment he will receive; a view apparently adopted by the A.B.A. ABA PRoJECT ON MINI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 254-55
(1967). A recent program in the Washington, D.C. Criminal Courts has demonstrated the
value of rehabilitative planning by the defendant, his counsel and social agencies. See
Dash, Medalie & Rhoden, Demonstrating Rehabilitative Planning as a Defense Strategy,
54 CORNELL L. REV. 408 (1969).
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cem for the defendant's fate after conviction. This demonstration of
concern, in turn, begins to define for the defendant-and induces him
to define for himself-the treatment goals which the state hopes his
incarceration will accomplish.
C. The Inadequacies of Plea Bargaining as a Sentencing Process
1. Indifference to Sentencing Data
In its present form, plea bargaining is irreconcilable with this model
for orderly and enlightened sentencing decisions.1 7 Since it is a dis-
guised sentencing procedure,' 8 the plea bargain often makes the sen-
tencing hearing an idle formality; by the time it occurs, the prosecutor,
the defendant and the judge may lack both the inclination and the
effective power to revise the sentence which the plea bargain has tacitly
fixed. Therefore, the sentencing process is deprived of the portrait of
the defendant which the sentencing hearing is supposed to assemble. 10
The pre-sentence report, as well as the detailed presentation of the
defendant's crime and character which ideally should emerge from his
trial, contains critical sentencing data which the parties will neglect
to consider during the bargaining process but which later may cast
doubt on the wisdom of the plea bargain.
2 0
2. Causes of Sentencing Disparity
The factors which do determine the sentencing outcomes of plea
bargaining are totally devoid of genuine penological significance.
17. Only a few commentators have noticed the incompatibility between plea bar-
gaining and the schemes for sentencing reform. See, e.g., Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing
Structure: Its Effect on Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 L. ,v
CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 499-500 (1958).
18. Enker, supra note 4, at 110. See also Rossett, supra note 1, at 71-72, who argues
that the results of plea bargaining systematically lack congruence with "the specific
charges of the case, the correctional needs of the defendant, and frequently, the social
interest in vigorous prosecution."
19. Efforts to gather adequate correctional data-both at the plea bargaining and
other stages of the criminal process-have also been inhibited by such factors as the
paucity of correctional resources, see PRESIDENT'S Co.M.SUSSION ON LAw E% rO c. LT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF jusTIcE, TAsK FoRCE REI'OR. CoRREcrio.,s 18-19 (1957) and
the characteristic mentality of defense lawyers themselves. Polstein. How to Settle a
Criminal Case, PRac. Lmw, Jan., 1972, at 35, 41, notes the failure of most law)ers to make
any kind of correctional evaluation of their clients, even when it might aid in obtaining
a more favorable plea bargain. And Enker, supra note 4, at 11l, asserts that the defense
counsel rarely investigates the defendant's background because he views his role not as
a "welfare worker" but as an advocate.
20. As a possible response to this problem, Krantz, supra note 5. urges that the pre-
sentence report be completed before plea negotiations commence. But pre-sentence in-
vestigation before conviction has been opposed on constitutional and policy grounds.
See Note, The Presentence Report, supra note 14, at 465-70.
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Three factors now exert a controlling influence on the concessions
a defendant will receive and hence the sentence he will eventually
serve: the evidential strength of the case against him, the number and
seriousness of the charges that his conduct will support, and the wealth
and resources at his command.2 1 Collectively, these factors cause wide
variation in the penal treatment which equally culpable defendants
receive. Ultimately, they breed an unhealthy cynicism among de-
fendants and thus contribute to their rejection of the penal system's
treatment goals.
a. Strength of the Prosecution's Case
When his evidence is weak, the prosecutor will propose generous
bargaining terms in order to overcome the defendant's inclination to
go to trial.2 2 When, on the other hand, the prosecutor's evidence is
strong, he will offer few plea concessions since the defendant whose
chance for acquittal is slight will need only a small inducement to
renounce his right to trial. One reason that the prosecutor adopts this
strategy is that he shares the administrative goal of the entire plea bar-
gaining system: the elimination of the maximum number of trials.
But another reason is that he wants to protect his conviction record.
Since no prosecutor wants to go to trial and lose, it is in his interest
to deter from trial those defendants whose acquittal is most probable.2
Plea concessions reduced to reflect the defendant's chances for ac-
quittal defeat two major goals which any enlightened criminal system
must pursue: reliable adjudication and uniform sentencing. The de-
fendant against whom the prosecutor's case is weak will either be guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the acts alleged or he will be legally
innocent.2 4 If he is guilty, sentencing uniformity requires an appro-
21. An additional factor is the degree of administrative strain that the court Is
experiencing at the particular moment. Polstein, supra note 19, suggests, at '10, that
defense counsel can rely on an "almost mathematical rule that the more crowded the
calendar, the lower the plea." He notes the very real risk that too prolonged a delay
between indictment and trial can make the prosecutor vulnerable to a motion to dismiss,
22. Alschuler, in The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cnt. L. REv. 50
(1968), expresses a typical view when he asserts, at 58, that "[t]he overwheling
majority of prosecutors view the strength or weakness of the state's case as the ntost
important factor in the task of bargaining," and, at 60, that the "greatest pressures to
plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent."
23. See Polstein, supra note 19, at 37, who contends the prosecutor's obsession with
his conviction rate derives from the way the public evaluates his performance. Compare
Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. OF CONFLIcT Ras. 52 (1967), In
which a study of a particular prosecutor's office revealed that the explanation for this
preoccupation was the desire "to maintain ... a reputation for utter credibility, inevi-
table truth, almost of invincibility." Id. at 57. See generally Alschuler, supra note 22.
24. Legal innocence, it should be stressed, must not be equated with factual i-
nocence. In the current plea bargaining process, not all defendants whose convictlo
proves difficult are factually innocent. The case against them may be weak because
292
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priately severe sanction, i.e., one equivalent to the punishment received
by other offenders who have committed similar crimes. On the other
hand, if he is innocent, he should be excluded altogether from the cor-
rectional process. By compromising somewhere between the only two
penologically acceptable classifications of the defendant, tie bargaining
process results in the imposition of either excessive or insufficient
punishment.
Whether it extends the right to trial to all or merely a few defend-
ants, any criminal system must strive to distinguish accurately between
those defendants who have committed crimes and those who have not.
The current bargaining process seriously impairs our system's ability
to make that distinction. By tempting the defendant who is most
probably innocent with the greatest concessions, it discourages a trial
in precisely those instances when only a trial can make a reliable deter-
mination of guilt or innocence.
2G
b. Overcharging
Observers of the prosecutor's bargaining strategy have noted that the
initial charges he files are frequently chosen in anticipation of the plea
bargain.2 6 The prosecutor often attempts to sweep within his indict-
ment every offense which the evidence against the defendant might
sustain. If the single criminal act of the defendant straddles several
offense categories, the prosecutor will charge the defendant with the
most serious offense applicable, knowing that the offense for which
he can realistically expect conviction is a "lesser included offense"
encompassed therein.27 Similarly, if the defendant's criminal activity
a police investigation has blundered, because a key witness can be easily impeached
or has fled the jurisdiction, or because crucial evidence has been supprc.sed. Sintilarl .
the prosecutor may lack confidence in his case because the defendant's deneanor will
impress the jury or because his conduct contains extenuating features which would
influence the jury to vote for acquittal. Despite their actual guilt, acquittal of such
defendants is perfectly consonant with our belief that punishment is warranted only
when guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be undesirable for
a plea bargaining system to undermine the integrity of the reasonable doubt standard
by convicting defendants whose conduct does not meet it.
25. Alschuler, supra note 22, at 62-63, suggests that the ideologFY of the lroseutor
may explain the bargaining process' insensitivity to the possibility of a defendant's
innocence:
It might be supposed that when a prosecutor decides to charge a defendant uith
a crime, he makes a personal judgment concerning the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence. Once the charge decision has been made, the prosecttor may regard trial
as a technical obstacle standing between the defendant and the punish1ent he
deserves.
26. In a manual for prosecuting attorneys, the Department of Justice has candidly
advised: "One method of encouraging such a [guilty] plea is to charge a felony at
the outset and in this way set the stage for subsequent bargaining." H. Sursm, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT oF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN METRO'OLITAN COURTS 34-35 (1966).
27. This practice has been termed "vertical overcharging" by Alschulcr, supra note
22, at 86.
293
The Yale Law Journal
is technically severable into a series of identical crimes, the prosecutor
will charge him with several counts of the same offense.28 By charging
the defendant at the statutory limit of his liability, the prosecutor is
able to generate incentives for the plea bargain. This technique-
frequently termed "overcharging"-permits the prosecutor to bargain
away several counts of his indictment or accept a plea to the least seri-
ous offense charged without risking an acquittal.
2-0
Overcharging compounds sentencing disparity because defendants
vary appreciably in their ability to perceive the practice and adjust
their bargaining strategy to compensate for it. A defendant who is
ignorant of the prosecution's case or who receives only perfunctory
advice from counsel may agree to plea "concessions" no more lenient
than the disposition he would receive if he were convicted after trial.
Since, by definition, the "overcharge" includes counts on which either
the jury would acquit or the judge would impose a concurrent sen-
tence, such a defendant will exchange his plea for illusory benefits.
In contrast, the defendant who has better counsel, more knowledge of
the prosecution's case, or merely greater familiarity with the behavior
of the trial court, will refuse to bargain until the prosecutor's terms
become more favorable than the court's foreseeable sentence. Although
both defendants may have committed equivalent crimes, the more
knowledgeable defendant will serve a substantially shorter sentence8 0
c. The Defendant's Wealth
Disparities in wealth and resources are another cause of unequal
access to plea concessions. The defendant's wealth influences his abil-
ity to make bail and the kind and quality of legal defense he can afford.
If the defendant cannot make bail, the prosecutor will enjoy a sub-
stantial bargaining advantage over him.8 1 Already incarcerated, this
28. Alschuler, supra note 22, at 87, terms this "horizontal overcharging."
29. See generally Enker, supra note 4, at 109-10; Freedman, The Professional Re-
sponsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. L. REV. 1030, 1035-36 (1967): Newman,
supra note 14, at 98-99.
Overcharging also complicates the task of correctional administrators who must make
subsequent decisions about the defendant's fate. Because many plea bargains restlt
in charge compromises, any attempt to infer the actual criminality of the defendant
from the offense for which he was convicted is highly unreliable. Without a record
of the defendant's trial, with its detailed account of his crime, or a knowledge of local
plea bargaining practices, treatment decisions are subject to a wide margin of error.
30. D. NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 46. In another article, Pleading Guilty for Con.
siderations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 780, 785 (1956), Newman
has observed that it is usually the recidivist who is best able to recognize and obtain
a good plea bargain.
31. On bail and plea bargaining, see White, supra note 4, at 444. On bail reform
generally, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. ILv.
959 (1965).
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defendant has little opportunity to prepare evidence to be used either
at trial or as a bargaining lever against the prosecutor. Moreover, each
additional day he lingers in jail weakens his desire to withhold his plea
and makes him more receptive to the prosecutor's offer. In contrast,
the bailed defendant can gradually maneuver the prosecutor into an
advantageous plea agreement without serious discomfort.
A wealthy defendant can also retain his own counsel rather than de-
pend on the public defender. When he bargains for a guilty plea, pri-
vate counsel is usually free from the administrative pressure which
plagues both the prosecutor and the public defender.32 He will there-
fore have the time and funds to research his client's case. In sharp con-
trast, the public defender-who usually cannot employ pre-plea dis-
covery to gather evidence33-must frequently accept the prosecution's
claim for his case at face value.
Because of both his less intimate relationship to the prosecutor3'
and his greater fund of time and resources, the private attorney can
employ a host of bargaining tactics which are generally unavailable
to the public defender. 35 The prosecutor may resort to comparable tac-
tics. He may attempt to "bluff" the defense lawyer by exaggerating the
strength of his case or feigning intractability when he has reached an
impasse in plea negotiations. 36 Occasionally, these bargaining tech-
niques frustrate the interests of both parties by backing them into a
trial which they do not want and from which they cannot hope to
gain.37
32. Nonetheless, there are many private attorneys whose resources barely excccd
those of the public defender. It is probably most accurate to conceive of the community
of lawyers as a continuum with the public defender and highly paid private attorney
at each extreme and, in between, lawyers of intermediate resources and time to devote
to their clients.
33. At present, no jurisdiction appears to authorize defense discovery prior to the
entry of a plea, as a matter of either statutory right or judicial discretion. rhe practice
in the federal system is typical; Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules permits discovery no
earlier than ten days after arraignment. See generally Comment, Preplea Discovery:
Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527 (1971).
34. Some critics of the public defender system have contended that the relationship
of the public defender and prosecutor is non-adversarial. According to this viewpoint.
the public defender will often cooperate in a bargained disposition which sacrifices the
interests of the defendant in order to serve the common administrative objectives of the
public defender and the prosecution. See, e.g., Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When
You Went To Court? No, I Had A Public Delender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. Acri 4 (1970);
Skolnick, supra note 23, at 60-70.
35. In his efforts to consume the prosecutor's time, the private attorneyi may, for
example, deluge the court with pre-trial motions, or resort to any pretext to gain a
continuance. He may even request the impaneling of a jury and begin trial if his
other tactics have not yet yielded the plea concessions he seeks.
36. On bluffing, see Alschuler, supra note 22, at 56.57; Polstein, supra note 19, at
40-41; Rossett, supra note 1, at 71-72.
37. See Alschuler, supra note 22, at 58.
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D. Judicial Control Over the Current Bargaining Process
At present, the judge is largely precluded from correcting the sen-
tencing disparities that the bargaining process produces. He enters the
process only after the bargain has been made, and then only to con-
duct a superficial oral examination of the defendant to satisfy him-
self that the resulting guilty plea is "voluntary" 38 and "intelligent"
and (in some jurisdictions) that it has a "factual basis." 40 Since this
examination 4' is limited to disclosure of riegotiating procedure, judi-
cial consideration of the actual bargain, and the sentencing decision it
embodies, is deferred until the sentencing hearing. At that hearing,
however, serious modification of the bargain is unlikely. If the judge
disregards the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation and imposes
a harsher sentence, he will be ordering a disposition that does not con-
form to the defendant's expectations in accepting the plea bargain." '
38. On voluntariness and the guilty plea, see generally Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Walcy v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). For compilations of the
federal and state law on voluntariness, see Chalker, Judicial Myopia, Di!ferential Sen.
tencing and the Guilty Plea-A Constitutional Examination, 6 AM. CGluM. L.Q. 187
(1968) and Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 5.
39. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), offers a detailed list of the requisite
elements for an understanding waiver of counsel prior to receipt of a guilty plea:
To be valid, such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable pulish.
ments themselves, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation
thereof and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.
332 U.S. at 724. The exact application of Von Moltke to the guilty plea itself is tin-
certain. The courts have found it difficult to delineate both the range of penalties of
which the defendant must be aware and the requisite depth with which he must
comprehend them. It is agreed, however, that a defendant must understand the nature
of the charge to which he is admitting his guilt, Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d
887 (5th Cir. 1967), and the terms of his eligibility for probation, Munich v. United
States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964). No consensus exists, however, on whether he must
also comprehend the more remote, collateral consequences of his conviction. See Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 875, for a summary of the case law with regard
to such collateral consequences of conviction as multiple offender liability and civil dis-
abilities.
40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 and ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 1.6 (recommending
universal adoption of the factual basis requirement). See generally Note, The Trial
Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WAsunINtboN U. L.Q.
306 (1966).
41. Since Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459 (1969), the judge cannot omit these inquiries in the exercise of his discre.
tion; if they are not made, the defendant's plea is automatically void.
42. Even when the judge intervenes in the bargaining process itself, he may not be
able to escape the hazards of awarding plea concessions which, at the sentencing hearing,
will seem unduly lenient. Illustrating this danger are two of the principal cases which
concern judicial participation in plea bargaining, United States ex rel. Elksnis v. GillIgan,
256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d
308 (2d Cir. 1963). In Gilligan, after learning that the defendant was not, as lie bad
assumed, a first felony offender, the judge violated a sentencing commitment lie had
made to the defendant during plea negotiations. And, in LaVallee, the trial judge, who
had assured the defendant of leniency, imposed a 20-30 year sentence when he learned
the full facts of the defendant's "vicious record." In both cases, the absence of sen-
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And if he overrules the prosecutor too often, defendants as a group
will become less inclined to negotiate their guilty pleas. Alternatively,
if the judge allows the defendant to withdraw his plea because he can-
not countenance its terms, his decision will necessitate renegotiation
of that plea and occasionally even a trial. Faced with these eventuali-
ties, both incompatible with the administrative rationale for plea bar-
gaining, the judge will usually choose to ratify the bargain automati-
cally. Moreover, judicial review of plea terms when the defendant
offers his plea cannot compensate for the judge's inability to correct
sentencing inequalities.43 Rejection of plea terms at this stage of the
bargaining process will require a wasteful renegotiation of the plea
bargain. More importantly, the judge usually functions in an infor-
mational vacuum when he receives the plea. Without the benefit of a
presentence report, trial observation of the defendant, or exposure to
the evidence against him, the judge cannot gauge the appropriateness
of the bargained disposition. Ignorant of the defendant's case, he may
have no choice but to acquiesce in that disposition until the sentenc-
ing hearing.4
4
In the rare instance when the judge decides to supersede the prose-
cutor by imposing a harsher sentence than the prosecutor recom-
mended, the defendant will understandably feel victimized by factors
beyond his control.45 At present, such a defendant is without remedy;
a reviewing court will probably consider his grievance the product of
the tactical uncertainty unavoidable in plea bargaining and deny him
tencing information during negotiations led the judge to sentencing commitments he
could not later conscionably honor.
43. A few jurisdictions have introduced this practice. See, e.g., People v. West, 3 Cal.
3d 595, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970), in which the California Supreme Court
required the terms of all plea bargains to appear in the court record. For an illuminating
discussion of West and its implications, see Comment, Judicial Supervision over California
Plea-Bargaining-Regulating the Trade, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 962, 980 (1971).
The Kings County, New York, Criminal Court has a similar procedure, see Krantz,
supra note 5, and the ABA has recommended its general adoption, see .B.A ST.NonoMs,
supra note 4, at 3.1.
Critics of the present bargaining process have consistently argued that similar ex-
pansions of the post-plea duties of the judge are the best remedy for the defects of
that process.
The ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, are typical. While discouraging, at 3.3. pre.plea
judicial participation, they advocate expanded judicial examination of the defendant
after his plea, at 1.4 and 1.5, and expanded inquiry into the factual basis of the de.
fendant's plea, at 1.6. Similar proposals appear in Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate
Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514, 514-23 (1969); White, supra note 4, at 462-63; Comment. Judicial
Supervision, supra, at 995; Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Rule 11 (April 1971), reprinted at 52 F.R.D. 469 (1971).
44. See p. 291 supra.
45. Of course, the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation can also err on the side
of harshness. If it does, the judge need not worry that adjusting the sentence downward
would result in unfairness to the defendant. However, he still may be reluctant to dis.
regard the recommendation. To do so may undermine the prosecutors credibility in
the eyes of defendants and thus indirectly reduce the efficiency of the bargaining process.
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the opportunity to tender a new plea.46 In reality, however, such in-
equities are not the result of strategic errors for which the defendant,
like any other disappointed litigant, should accept responsibility. In-
stead, they reflect a major imperfection of the current bargaining proc-
ess: the judge's effective abdication of his sentencing authority to the
prosecutor, subject to intermittent reassertions of that power which
the defendant can in no way foresee.
47
E. The Defendant's Perceptions of the Bargaining Process
The most serious shortcoming of plea bargaining as a sentencing
process is the negative perceptions which it encourages defendants to
form of the legal system. Sentencing inequalities are widely publicized
and compared among inmates, 48 accentuating the outrage of the de-
fendant who feels he has been misled into accepting an excessively
harsh sentence and reinforcing the smugness of the defendant who has
bargained for an unduly light sentence. Both defendants derive the
same lesson from sentencing disparities: the bargaining process re-
sponds to adept manipulation, not to neutral and consistent sentencing
principles.
49
Defendants are also demoralized by the furtive and summary meth-
ods that the bargaining process employs. Pleas are often the product
of brief and clandestine consultations between the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel which may occur in the courthouse corridor or the prose-
cutor's office. The defendant rarely attends these consultations, let
alone participates in them. And the judge frequently pretends that
46. Holding that an unfulfilled expectation of leniency, even if inspired by counsel,
is not a valid ground for plea withdrawal are: Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680
(4th Cir. 1953); Futterman v. United States, 202 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1952): In re Atchley,
48 Cal. 2d 408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); People v. Schmidt, 10 111. 2d 221, 139 N.E.2d 726 (1957).
Holding that the defendant cannot withdraw his plea merely because he has re-
ceived a more severe sentence than anticipated, even though the prosecutor may have
assured him of leniency, are: Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 196-1);
People v. Baldridge, 19 111. 2d 616, 169 N.E.2d 353 (1960).
47. Unpredictably harsh judicial responses to the plea bargain illustrate the failure
of the current bargaining process to provide for pleas that are genuinely "knowing,"
The present judicial examination of the defendant is designed to insure that 1e Is
apprised of the legal consequences of his plea-of the scope of the rights lie Is fore
going when he waives a trial, the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty,
and the statutory disabilities, penal and otherwise, to which his conviction will subject
him. See note 39 supra. Yet this information is less useful in the real calculations which
precede a guilty plea than other information which is now unavailable to the defendant
before the sentencing hearing, yet which a truly rational choice of plea should consider.
See D. NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 208. To assess the nerits of any proposed plea bar-
gain, the defendant seeks to forecast the precise consequences he can expect it lie comn-
sents to that bargain, if he insists on continuing plea negotiations, or if he declines
to bargain and instead asserts his right to trial.
48. D. NEiwMAN, supra note 14, at 43.
49. See J. CAsPER, CRimINAL JusTicE, THE CONSUMER PERSl'E alvE 3-54 (1972)
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such encounters do not take place, thereby clinging to the fiction that
the sentencing hearing is the sole forum in which the sentencing de-
cision is made.50
From the defendant's perspective, plea bargaining lacks not only
procedural regularity but also the personalization of punishment
which advocates of individualized sentencing have sought. At no point
do the judge and prosecutor manifest a recognition of the individual
defendant's needs or articulate how the form of punishment they have
applied will benefit either the defendant or the public.
Finally, the judge's peripheral role in plea bargaining leads many
defendants to believe that the prosecutor dominates the criminal sys-
tem and that the judge is virtually powerless.51 Understandably, these
defendants may lose faith in the separation between the accusatorial
and the adjudicative arms of the state which our system so earnestly
strives to maintaifi.
52
II. An Alternative to the Current Bargaining Process
No plea bargaining system can incorporate all the due process safe-
guards that trial adjudication has historically provided without sac-
rificing its administrative virtues. But the more modest goal of sentenc-
ing due process is well within the reach of a plea bargaining system.
In order to realize that goal, the judge must reclaim his traditional re-
sponsibility for sentencing. He must replace the prosecutor as the chief
source of the plea concessions that the defendant is offered.
Merely substituting the judge for the prosecutor, however, will not
improve the bargaining process unless the present setting and method
of plea bargaining are also altered. The judge must award plea con-
cessions with the aid of full sentencing information about the de-
fendant, and this information must be available at the outset, not the
conclusion, of plea negotiations. Furthermore, the evaluation of this
information, and the determination of the terms for the defendant's
plea, must occur in an open advocacy proceeding which respects the
procedural rights of the defendant and permits him to participate fully
in the deliberation of his fate.
50. Most defendants assume the real purpose of both the official sentencing pro-
cedure and judicial interrogation of the defendant is to prott-ct the image of the s)steln.
A Connecticut defendant says of this inquiry: "If an)bod)'s in the courtroom. )ott
know, you gotta make a little show for them." J. CistEaR, supra note 49. at 3.39.
51. A Connecticut defendant expresses a typical view: "The person who runs the
show is the prosecutor, you know." Interview with a Connecticut felony defendant, quoted
in J. CAsPrE, supra note 49, at V-16.
52. J. CAsPEa, supra note 49, at V-27-28, has perceptively anal)yzed the consequences
of this loss of judicial independence.
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A. The Pre-Plea Conference
Such a proceeding could take the form of a pre-plea conference, con-
ducted by a judge whose sole task is to oversee plea agreements. This
conference could be modeled on the present sentencing hearing and
draw elaborately on the resources and techniques which have been de-
signed for sentencing.
Reconstructed along these lines, the pre-plea stage of the criminal
process would include the following steps:
1. Once the prosecutor obtained an indictment or filed an infor-
mation, his discretion to nolle prosequi would be suspended until the
pre-plea conference. Prior to this conference, the judge would summar-
ily decline to grant motions to dismiss, except on exceptional and
highly circumscribed grounds. One such ground might be the prose-
cutor's decision to dismiss the entire proceeding against the defendant.
Another might be the defendant's successful showing that his indict-
ment was invalidly obtained.
2. Independent consultations between the defendant (or his counsel)
and the prosecutor would be discouraged. If they occurred prior to in-
dictment, they would have to be reported to the judge at the pre-plea
conference so that he could determine their possible influence on that
indictment's scope.
3. When the defendant first appeared before the court, he would be
informed of his right to request a pre-plea conference. The judge
would have no discretion to decline this request. Although the con-
ference itself would be held only at the initiative of the defendant, the
judge would have to reject any guilty plea until after the conference.
4. When the judge granted the defendant's motion for a pre-plea
conference, he would simultaneously order pre-plea discovery to begin
and instruct the probation office to begin its presentence investigation
of the defendant.
5. When pre-plea discovery and the presentence report were com-
pleted, the contents of the presentence report would be disclosed
to both parties and the discoverable evidence of both parties would be
produced before the judge.
6. If the defendant filed any motions to suppress evidence, the judge
would hear such motions before convening the pre-plea conference, and
any evidence suppressed would be inadmissible at the conference as
well as at trial.53 Suppression motions raised at the conference itself
53. In United States v. Schipiani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit held
that illegally obtained evidence can be admitted at a post-trial sentencing hearing it
it is clearly reliable and is not obtained for the purpose of improperly influencing the
sentencing judge. However, this decision was based on the court's belief that "applylng
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would, where appropriate, lead to a stay of the proceedings pending a
hearing on those motions.
7. Depending on the desire of the parties, the pre-plea conference
would be held either in the judge's chambers or in open court. In
either case, it would be fully transcribed.
8. At the conference there would be a full exploration of the fol-
lowing subjects: the factual and analytic accuracy of the presentence
report; the nature of the culpability and criminal misconduct of the
defendant as portrayed by the discoverable evidence; and the manner
and duration of incarceration which is most consistent with the de-
fendant's culpability and his prospects for rehabilitation. Should either
of the parties wish to introduce witness testimony on any of these sub-
jects, he would have to subpoena those witnesses in advance of the
conference. The judge would have discretion to limit the number of
such witnesses if administrative considerations so warranted. After
beginning the conference, the judge would issue a stay to allow pro-
duction of witnesses only in exceptional circumstances.
9. After the foregoing subjects were explored, both the prosecution
and the defense would submit to the judge a proposed disposition of
the defendant's case. Each proposed disposition would include, if ap-
propriate, a recommendation for charge dismissal or reduction as well
as a recommended sentence on each remaining charge.
10. At the conclusion of the conference, or after an appropriate in-
terval, the judge would order two alternative dispositions of the de-
fendant's case. The first would be imposed after conviction at trial,
and would have been either selected from the dispositions submitted
by counsel or formulated by the judge himself. It would include what-
ever charge reductions or dismissals the judge found appropriate and
a sentence designation for each remaining charge. The second disposi-
tion would be imposed following a plea of guilty, and would be deter-
mined by reducing the total sentence designated for the post-trial dis-
position by a specific discount rate. This rate would be uniform for all
defendants within a given jurisdiction and would embody the median
plea concession necessary to induce an administratively acceptable vol-
ume of guilty pleas in that jurisdiction."4 The judge would be re-
the exclusionary rule for a second time at sentencing after having applied it once at
trial would not add in any significant way to the deterrent effect of the rule." Id. at 28.
Since most defendants who would move for a pre-plea conference would never stand
trial, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from that conference would be the only
means of achieving the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in the vast majority
of cases. Therefore, as would seem to follow from Schipiani's reasoning, such evidence
should be excluded from the pre-plea process.
54. It would be difficult to set an effective rate of discount in advance of the actual
operation of the pre-plea process. Its actual calculation would be a function of judicial
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quired to announce these alternative dispositions without recommen-
dation or comment.
11. The defendant would then choose either to accept the terms
stipulated by the judge for his guilty plea or to stand trial. Should
he choose to plead guilty, the terms stipulated for that plea would
automatically take effect when the plea was tendered. The judge
would order the dismissal of charges as promised and impose the sen-
tence announced. If he did not, the defendant would be permitted to
withdraw his plea. 55 When the defendant tendered his plea, the judge
would make the same examination of the defendant that he conducts
at present.
12. If the defendant decided to stand trial, he would be tried before
a judge who had not participated in the pre-plea conference. The rec-
ord of that conference would be privileged until the close of the trial,
and both parties would be forbidden to introduce at trial statements
or admissions that were made at the conference.
13. If the defendant were convicted after trial, the trial judge would
receive the full record of the pre-plea conference together with the
presentence report. In his discretion, he could hold a sentencing hear-
ing, although the record of the pre-plea conference would probably
make such a hearing unnecessary. In either case, the sentence he pro-
nounced could not exceed the sentence which the pre-plea judge had
designated for the defendant's conviction after trial. However, the trial
judge would retain full discretion to sentence more leniently than the
pre-plea judge if he thought it appropriate.
14. If the stipulated post-trial disposition had included the dismissal
of any charges, these charges would be summarily dismissed before
trial, with or without the prosecutor's approval. Moreover, after the
pre-plea conference but before trial, the prosecutor would be unable
to amend or abridge his indictment, except on a showing that neither
measure had been taken to induce the defendant's guilty plea and that
exceptional circumstances-such as newly discovered evidence-war-
ranted some alteration in the charge against the defendant. Further-
more, should the judge permit a change in the indictment, he would
also have to grant a subsequent defense motion to convene a new pre-
plea conference.
15. The defendant would be able to reconsider his refusal to accept
experience, statistical reckoning and the relative congestion which each individual court
docket faces.
55. The judge's failure to honor the announced terms for the defendant's plea
would be easily demonstrable from the transcribed record of the pre-plea conference.
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the pre-plea terms at any time prior to the beginning of trial. If, before
trial, he decided to plead guilty, the terms for that plea would auto-
matically correspond to the guilty plea disposition which had been
offered by the pre-plea judge. However, once his trial had begun, the
defendant would no longer have automatic recourse to the pre-plea
terms. Should he plead guilty while his trial was in progress, the trial
judge would retain full sentencing discretion.
B. Advantages of the Pre-Plea Conference
This model for the bargaining process promises to improve plea
bargaining in several ways.
First, it would curb the prosecutor's opportunity to abuse his charg-
ing power. The exercise of that power would be confined to the pre-
plea conference; the judge would evaluate proposed charge reductions
and dismissals in light of the larger background of the defendant's case
and the cumulative plea concessions he may merit; and the judge
would have an independent power to compel charge reductions and
dismissals despite the objection of the prosecutor. 0 Hence, the prose-
cutor would be unable to profit from overcharging the defendant.
Second, the pre-plea conference would stress the systematic use of
sentencing information and sentencing criteria as the measure of plea
concessions. The conference would be structured to stimulate the ad-
versaries to debate the penological merits of the defendant's case-his
actual culpability, the scope of his participation in the crime alleged,
his criminal and personal history, and the social and individual inter-
ests which the application of various sanctions might advance or injure.
As a consequence, defendants who plead guilty would receive sentences
that are more uniform and less arbitrary.
Third, the conference would restrain illegally obtained evidence
from influencing criminal dispositions. Under the current bargaining
process, the prosecutor can use evidence derived from illegal police
conduct to convince the defendant of the strength of the case against
him. If the defendant is unaware of the infirmity of that evidence, and
if the bargain is completed before suppression motions can be heard,
the prosecutor can thus exploit the informality of the bargaining proc-
ess to dilute the defendant's constitutional protections. Under the pro-
56. At least one jurisdiction, California, has already taken steps to accord the judge
an independent dismissal power. See People v. Tenerio, 3 Cal. 3d 89. 89 Cal. Rptr. 249.
473 P.2d 993 (1970).
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posed pre-plea procedure, however, the court would complete any re-
quested motions hearing before the conference, and evidence sup-
pressed at that hearing would become inadmissible at the conference.
This procedure would safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights
and insure that police misconduct did not escape censure because of a
hastily concluded plea bargain.57
As its fourth advantage, the pre-plea conference would discourage
the use of tactics wasteful of judicial time and resources. Neither de-
fense nor prosecution would have any incentive to seek unnecessary
continuances or contrived pre-trial motions in order to erode its op-
ponent's bargaining strength. The conference would make a single,
final determination of the plea concessions a defendant could expect
to receive. Once these concessions were fixed, no amount of strategic
maneuvering could alter them. The pre-plea conference thus promises
a significant gain in efficiency to the criminal process.
Fifth, the pre-plea conference would permit the defendant to par-
ticipate more rationally in the bargaining process. He would know
more accurately the risks of standing trial and the potential benefits
of a guilty plea. Moreover, because much of the prosecution's case
would be discoverable prior to any. plea agreement, the defendant
would be able to predict his fate at trial with greater certainty.58
Finally, the pre-plea conference would tend to equalize the tactical
positions of affluent and indigent defendants."o The reduction in
wasteful bargaining tactics would favor indigent defendants, whose lack
of resources precludes costly and elaborate bargaining strategies. Since
the presentence report and pre-plea discovery would be the principal
resources for this conference, preparation for it would probably not be
significantly more burdensome for the public defender. And since
this preparation and the hearing itself would impose modest time
demands on its participants, it is unlikely that the overworked public
defender would be at a serious disadvantage. Moreover, the pre-plea
conference would permit the public defender to be a more zealous advo-
cate for his client. The prosecutor would no longer be responsible for
plea concessions, and thus the public defender's alleged deference to
the prosecutor would not inhibit him in protecting his client's interests.
57. See note 53 supra.
58. One federal district court has already experimented with pre-plea discovery.
For a discussion of its encouraging results, see Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Ex-
periment in Federal Criminal Discovery, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (1968).
59. See pp. 294-95 supra. Nevertheless, the pre-plea conference would only minimize,
not eliminate, the bargaining disadvantage under which non-bailed defendants labor.
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C. Evaluation of Possible Criticisms of the Pre-Plea Conference
1. Hazards of Judicial Intervention
The most important objection to the pre-plea process would un-
doubtedly be directed at its principal feature: the central role it assigns
to the judge in determining plea concessions and inducing guilty pleas.
Active judicial participation in plea bargaining frequently has been
opposed in the belief that it would aggravate the coercion already in-
herent in the bargaining process. 60 Presumably, the prestige of the
judge would overcome the defendant's voluntariness more readily than
any equivalent prosecutorial pressure.61
Judicial involvement in the bargaining process would shift the
source of this coercion but not necessarily its degree. Plea bargaining
is coercive largely because of the burden it places on the right to trial
and the risk of hardship which the exercise of that right entails. At
present, the prosecutor has the principal responsibility for persuading
the defendant of the hardship he will face by asserting his right to trial;
hence, he is the main source of the "coercion" which the process ap-
plies to the defendant.62 Concessions which the judge offers or penal-
ties which he threatens would not necessarily be more coercive because
he is the judge; their coerciveness depends primarily on whether they
are more or less generous than the concessions the prosecutor would
himself have offered. 3 Since the concessions that the pre-plea judge
offered would be more lenient for some defendants but less lenient
for others, the contention that he will be uniformly more coercive is
groundless.
Of course, to assert that judicial bargaining is not inherently more
coercive does not preclude it from becoming so if the judge uses his
60. See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966):
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings to bear the
full force and majesty of his office .... [H]is commitment has an all.perasive
and compelling influence in inducing the accused to yield his right to trial.
See also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v. Earegood,
12 Mich. App. 256 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 253
A.2d 689 (1969).
61. Judge Weinfeld in United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 255
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), explicitly distinguishes prosecutorial from judicial bargaining and finds
the latter more coercive.
62. See generally Recent Development, supra note 5, at 1086:
[T]he prosecutor has many means not available to the judge of putting preure
upon the defendant .... [T]he "disparity of positions," in terms of power over
the accused, may be even greater between the prosecutor and the defendant than
between judge and defendant.
63. At least one court has accepted this reasoning. See Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp.
601, 606 (D. Neb. 1964): "Whether the court or prosecutor makes the threats or promise
seems immaterial."
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authority to "browbeat" a defendant into accepting a plea bargain.
However, the pre-plea conference would contain elaborate safeguards
against such abusive judicial conduct: The judge would act as a neutral
arbiter, presiding impartially over the presentation of facts and sen-
tencing recommendations by both defense and prosecution. He would
announce the alternative dispositions of the defendant's case without
comment, expressing no opinion on their relative advantages. Direct
pressure on the defendant to plead guilty would thus be forbidden.
Not only would the pre-plea conference guard against judicial coer-
cion, it would also diminish the danger of prosecutorial coercion so
immediate in the present plea bargaining process. The prosecutor
would be forbidden to discuss plea terms with the defendant or his
counsel outside of the conference itself. During the conference, the
prosecutor's presentation would be limited in scope and addressed
solely to the judge. Threats as well as more devious forms of persuasion
by the prosecutor or the judge would be discernible from the record
and would constitute grounds for reversal of a subsequent guilty plea
conviction.
Another ground for opposition to judicial intervention in the bar-
gaining process is the fear that it would make defendants doubtful
that they would receive a fair trial.64 But this criticism is valid only if
the judge with whom the defendant has bargained were the same judge
who would later preside at his trial. In the proposed pre-plea pro-
cedure, this would not be the case. Skeptics have argued that even
a trial judge who remained aloof from plea negotiations would be
biased against a defendant who had refused a plea bargain offered by
a fellow judge.6 5 However, it is surely more reasonable to anticipate
that the trial judge who is aware that a defendant has declined a plea
bargain would be all the more willing to credit the seriousness of his
claim of innocence.
A third criticism of judicial intervention is that a judge who partici-
pated in the negotiation of a guilty plea could not later objectively
examine the defendant to determine whether the plea was intelligently
and voluntarily made.6 6 However, the effectiveness of that examina-
tion, as currently conducted, has been exaggerated.0 7 Neither prosecu-
tion nor defense now disclose candidly the full details of their plea
64. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4.
65. For criticism of such a separation of trial and bargaining judges, see White,
supra note 4, at 443 n.73, and ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 74.
66. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52 (1969).
67. See p. 296 supra.
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negotiation. 8 Moreover, since few plea bargains can be faulted for the
negotiating tactics which produced them,69 only occasional guilty pleas
now qualify as "involuntary" or "unknowing."
The pre-plea conference actually promises to safeguard the intelli-
gence and voluntariness of the defendant's plea more scrupulously than
the present process. A record would be available to substantiate alle-
gations of official misconduct for appellate review. In addition, by
reducing the uncertainty with which the defendant chooses among
plea alternatives, the pre-plea process would facilitate pleas that are
more genuinely knowing.7
0
Finally, the critics of judicial involvement argue that "bargaining
judges" would detract from the judiciary's image as a neutral and
principled arbiter.7 1 However, the present judicial posture in the bar-
gaining process is far from aloof. If the judge regularly refused to
accept the defendant's plea to a lesser offense,72 if he did not grant
the prosecutor's motion to dismiss charges, 73 or if he consistently dis-
regarded the sentencing recommendations of the prosecutor, the in-
centives for plea bargaining would rapidly disappear.
68. At this late stage in the bargaining process, the interests of the prosecutor and
defendant are no longer adverse. Instead, they have a joint commitment to the success
of the plea bargain they have shaped. The parties therefore seek to present to the
judge a facade of scrupulous regularity. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note
5, at 886.
69. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on
a confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958), cited with approval in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970):
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises) or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes).
Prosecutorial conduct that will vitiate a guilty plea includes unreasonable threats,
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 550 U.S. 116 (1956); Walker v. Johnstone, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); overtures to
the defendant without the presence or knowledge of his lawyer, Shupe v. Sigler, 230
F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964); Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 931 (W.D.N.C.
1963); and reneging on earlier promises to the defendant, Santobello v. New York,
92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
70. See note 47 supra.
71. White, supra note 4, at 453. See also Recent Dcvelopment, supra note 5. at 1089
("Toleration of a procedure which leads defendants to think of the judge as just one
more official to be 'bought off' is clearly not conducive to respect for the law" (foot-
note omitted)); Note, Unconstitutionality, supra note 1, at 1392-93.
72. In almost all jurisdictions, a defendant cannot tender a plea to a lesser offense
unless the judge accepts it. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN . § 54-60 (1958); Izs.
STAT. ANN. 630.30 (1946); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-24-8 (1953).
73. In most jurisdictions, the prosecutor cannot nolle prosequi a charge for which
the defendant has been indicted without first obtaining judicial approval. See, e.g.,
NEv. Rv. STAT. § 178.510 (1956); OKLA. STAT. ANN., Title 22, § 815 (1960). On the
prosecutor's dismissal power, see generally Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L.
REy. 1057, 1066-67 (1955).
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The judicial commitment to plea bargaining is also manifested in
the policy of differential sentencing. It is universally acknowledged
that, even absent an explicit agreement with the prosecutor, the judge
will reward the defendant who pleads guilty with a reduced sentence.",
And it is equally common, if less acceptable, for the judge to punish
the defendant who has been convicted at trial by withholding the sen-
tencing concessions he will extend to the defendant who has pled
g ilty.75
In the proposed pre-plea process, just as at present, the judge would
be clearly committed to the persuasion of the great mass of defendants
to forego their right to trial. However, both the defendant and the
public would be more inclined to view his behavior as principled and
consistent: His participation in the process would be formalized, his
discretion prescribed by strict rules, and his role would be that of
mediator between opposing interests rather than the advocate of the
state against the accused. More importantly, the pre-plea process would
restore the judge to his rightful place at the center of the criminal
system, thus arresting the tendency of the current process to reduce
him to a state of powerlessness.
2. Volume of Guilty Pleas
Another possible objection to the pre-plea process is that it would
not elicit a sufficient number of guilty pleas, thereby defeating the
principal rationale for plea bargaining. However, the discount rate
would afford each jurisdiction a simple device for manipulating the
proportion of guilty pleas it received; by lowering that rate to a suit-
able level, it would be able to insure a volume of guilty pleas equal to
74. For an empirical study of the pervasiveness of differential sentencing, see Com.
ment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66
YALE L.J. 204 (1956). On differential sentencing generally, see Chalker, supra note 38.
75. Many courts and commentators have distinguished between rewarding the guilty
plea, which is a generally accepted practice and punishing the claim ot innocence,
which is generally disfavored.
The ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, seem to accept this distinction when, at 1.8, they
approve judicial concessions to guilty pleaders but condemn harsh sentences for de.
fendants who are convicted after trial.
The courts likewise have made much of this distinction. See United States v. Wiley,
267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959), in which the sentence of a defendant convicted after
trial was vacated for, among other reasons, the announced policy of the trial court
to deny probation to those convicted after trial. See also People v. Morales, 252 Cal.
App. 2d 537, 60 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1967).
Conversely, the judicial policy of rewarding guilty pleas with leniency has generally
withstood appellate attack. See Dewey v. United States, 268 F.2d 124, 128 (8th Cir.
1959); People v. Guidan, 5 App. Div. 2d 975, 172 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1958).
Nonetheless, the distinction seems more semantic than real. As Judge Levin pointed
out in People v. Earegood, 12 Mich. App. 256, 268, 162 N.W. 802, 812 (1968): "Guilty
pleaders cannot receive lighter sentences unless those convicted upon trial receive
heavier sentences-disparity there must be."
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-if not larger than-the volume of guilty pleas that the present system
generates.
Of course, the prospect of an undiminished number of guilty pleas
under the pre-plea procedure does not mean that the same defendants
would be pleading guilty or that the same concessions would be
awarded to any particular class of defendants. Defendants against
whom the state's evidence is strong, who are indigent and represented
by a public defender, or whose criminal conduct readily lends itself
to overcharging would receive greater concessions than at present. To
such defendants, the pre-plea judge would be more generous than the
pragmatic prosecutor, who now concedes no more than is necessary
to offset the improbable benefits anticipated from trial. On the other
hand, the defendant against whom the state's evidence is weak would
undoubtedly receive less generous terms for his guilty plea than he
would at present and might as a consequence be more inclined to
opt for trial. By affording a trial to such a defendant, the pre-plea
process will result in more reliable distinctions between innocence and
guilt. The net outcome would probably be a gain in sentencing equity
without an unacceptable decline in the total number of guilty pleas.
3. Self-incrimination
A more serious criticism of the pre-plea conference is that it would
jeopardize the Fifth Amendment privilege of the defendant who later
stands trial by prematurely disclosing his case to the prosecutor and
compelling admissions of guilt which would aid the prosecutor in
gathering and organizing his evidence. Several features of the pre-plea
conference, however, would mitigate this danger.
First, the presentence report could be limited to biographical infor-
mation about the defendant and only such evidence of his alleged
crime as would otherwise be discoverable. Second, the defendant would
retain his usual Fifth Amendment privilege at the pre-plea conference;
if he feared that his response to the inquiries of the judge would preju-
dice his case at trial, he would be free to remain silent. Third, the pro-
hibition against use at trial of evidence submitted at the conference
should prevent the prosecutor from gaining an overwhelming tactical
advantage over the defendant. Finally, the trend toward pre-trial dis-
covery76 by the prosecution indicates that, in many jurisdictions, the
76. Advocating discovery by the prosecution are Rule 16 of Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547 (1970), and the A.IEI CAN BAR ASSOCITION. STANDARDS RArING
To DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEroRE TRIAL (Approved Draft 1970), at 3.1 and 3.2. In
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). the Supreme Court held that at least some forms
of compelled discovery by the prosecution are not forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.
The Yale Law Journal
pre-plea conference would alter the timing but not the scope of the
defendant's revelations to the prosecution.
However, these safeguards can never be completely effective. There
is reason to doubt that an exclusionary rule can totally deter the prose-
cutor from using evidence at trial which has been indirectly derived
from testimony presented at a confidential hearing."7 Perhaps more
seriously, the defendant might succumb to the presumption of guilt
which would pervade the conference. A defendant would be encour-
aged to present evidence in mitigation of his culpability, and such evi-
dence is likely to be of considerable value to a prosecutor seeking to
discover the exact circumstances of his crime. By penalizing the de-
fendant who withholds potentially incriminating evidence with a
harsher sentence, the pre-plea process would come perilously-although
not impermissibly-close to diluting the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
78
Despite these hazards, it must be stressed that in the pre-plea proc-
ess, just as in the present bargaining procedure, few defendants would
ultimately stand trial. 0 The possibility of prejudice to the defendant
who would go to trial must therefore be weighed against the benefits
which the pre-plea conference could offer to the many defendants who
77. Under the proposed pre-plea process, the trial judge would employ the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" refinement of the exclusionary rule to suppress the derivative
fruits of pre-plea testimony. Those fruits could be distinguished from validly adnils.
sible evidence by applying the "independent source," "inevitable discovery" and "attenua-
tion" tests which the courts have evolved to aid their enforcement of the exclusionary
rule. See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 579, 621-30 (1968). However, these tests have been faulted for being awkward,
arbitrary and inefficient. See, e.g., Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant
Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 (1967).
78. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970),
strongly suggests that this feature of the pre-plea conference would not offend the
Fifth Amendment. Rejecting the defendant's claim that his privilege against compelled
self-incrimination had been violated, the Williams Court upheld a Florida statute re-
quiring either disclosure of alibi witnesses in advance of trial or forfeiture of the op-
portunity to present an alibi defense at trial. The dilemma in which that statute placed
the defendant is analogous to the dilemma the pre-plea conference creates: the de-
fendant must either reveal evidence that may prove incriminating or risk the possibility
of subsequent prejudice. Because, under the Florida procedure, the defendant could
choose to withhold evidence, the Williams Court reasoned that any disclosures he did
decide to make were not "compelled" in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.
399 U.S. at 84. Since the pre-plea conference contains a comparable element of strategic
choice, similar logic would seem to purge it of any constitutional infirmity. Although
it may often be disadvantageous for him to do so, the pre-plea defendant is free to
withhold any testimony that might incriminate him at trial.
79. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the great majority of defendants-certain
that their conviction is inevitable-view sentencing, rather than adjudication, as the
stage of the criminal process that affects their interests most vitally. See Ohlln &'
Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect on Systems for the Administration o]
Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 495, 499-500 (1958). Defendants who have this
conception of the criminal process would probably not feel oppressed by a procedure
which weakened their chance for acquittal at trial but strengthened their ability to
obtain equitable sentences.
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would tender a guilty plea. For those defendants, the pre-plea confer-
ence would be the only opportunity for a full revelation of the facts
of their crimes, without which vital symbolic and penal functions
would be left unperformed.
4. Administrative Costs
Also troubling are the apparent administrative costs of the pre-plea
process. At first glance, the conference would seem to expend resources
and time which neither the judge, the prosecutor nor the defendant
can spare. However, while the pre-plea process would inevitably exact
certain additional administrative costs, these costs would be smaller
than its complicated machinery suggests.
The judge's duties at the conference would not be substantially more
elaborate than those he now performs at the sentencing hearing. And
since the pre-plea conference would usually obviate the need for a
hearing, it would alter the timing, but not the magnitude, of the time
required for each defendant's case. Moreover, in the interest of econ-
omy, one judge might be designated to take sole responsibility for
presiding over pre-plea conferences. Arguably, this judge would be
more efficient than the present trial judge, whose attention is divided
among several cases, each at a different stage of development.
The pre-plea conference might expedite criminal proceedings in still
another respect. Because it would eliminate the wasteful tactics which
some prosecutors and defendants now employ, and because bargaining
would be limited to a single session, both judge and prosecutor would
be able to allocate their time more efficiently and systematically.
Nevertheless, the pre-plea conference would unavoidably make addi-
tional demands of the prosecutor and the public defender, who would
be required to devote more preparation and thought to bargained dis-
positions.8 0 In the final analysis, this incremental burden must be
recognized-and accepted-as the price of a more equitable and effec-
tive. criminal system. Even with such costs, the pre-plea conference
would be far less demanding than the unabridged trial that would
result from the total abolition of plea bargaining. Its requirements
could be accommodated by modestly expanding the present resources
of the prosecutor and public defender. The commitment of the addi-
tional funds and manpower for this purpose, if properly explained,
should be politically feasible.
80. Despite this increased workload, judicial supervision and control, virtually non-
existent under the present system, could insure that the public defender diligently
performed his duties under the restructured bargaining procedure.
The Yale Law Journal
5. The Presumption of Guilt
The final criticism the pre-plea process must face is that it would
institutionalize a "presumption of guilt." By rewarding defendants
who inculpate themselves and thus spare the state the expense of prov-
ing their guilt, the process arguably weakens the vitality of our consti-
tutional commitment to the right to trial. Yet the present plea bar-
gaining process embodies a presumption of guilt no less pervasive, for
it imposes an equally stiff penalty on those defendants who choose
to assert their innocence. It is arguable, of course, that this penalty
is now imposed sub rosa and thus can be easily eliminated whenever
our society devotes sufficient resources to its criminal system to afford
a trial for every defendant; in contrast, the proposed pre-plea process
would establish judicial machinery that might prove much harder to
dismantle. Nonetheless, a massive commitment of resources to criminal
justice is not presently a realistic prospect. Until it is, there can be little
to praise in a system which espouses one theory of criminal procedure
yet practices another.
D. Conclusion
The pre-plea process proposed by this Note is hardly a panacea for
all theevils of plea bargaining. Even if it were instituted, judges, prose-
cutors and public defenders would continue to be more responsive to
docket congestion than to the needs of the individual defendant. The
indigent defendant would still feel pressured to agree to a plea bar-
gain rather than linger in pre-trial confinement until his case came
to trial. The innocent defendant might choose to plead guilty rather
than risk the harsher punishment that he would face if he were con-
victed. And the guilty defendant who stands trial would still serve a
longer sentence merely because he had exercised a right that the Con-
stitution guarantees him.
The pre-plea process promises to minimize these inequities. It can-
not eliminate them entirely because they are inherent in the very
nature of plea bargaining. Complete reform of the plea bargaining
process must inevitably await the complete abolition of plea bargaining.
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